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restructuring and liquidation systems than those in 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The insolvency systems in the MENA region are by and large underdeveloped. One of the main 
shortcomings is the approach to debtors as wrongdoers, even criminals, rather than economic actors in 
distress. Legal provisions rely heavily on criminal law, for enforcement, though the rate of imprisonment 
varies widely among countries—it is rare in some, but alarmingly common for a modern society in 
others—see Text Box—Checks, Commerce and the Criminalization of Debt. Several countries in the 
region have laws that punish debtors with civil penalties such as loss of the right to manage a company, 
restriction of movement (seizure of passport), and even prison. The approach to a debtor as an entity to be 
rehabilitated is rare in spirit, and still more rare in practice, as across the region, reorganization is rare, 
even when legal provisions may allow it. Such reorganization provisions tend to be heavily creditor-
driven,  providing  little  flexibility  to  debtors.  Even  liquidation  procedures,  which  are  perhaps  better 
understood, are considered ineffective. Provisions in the laws are dated.  Many of the laws have not been 
revised and modernized for a decade, or several decades. None of the countries in the regions have laws 
that comply with modern international best practice standards. There is an urgent need to decriminalize 
bankruptcy, to focus on reorganization to rehabilitate debtors in financial distress, and modernize the laws 
so that they serve the needs of the growing economies in the region. 
 
However, reforming laws will not be sufficient. Even more than the legal provisions, the main 
reason for the lack of effectiveness appears to be inefficient enforcement and implementation.
i Court 
systems tend to be slow, and very formalistic and bureaucratic. Procedures are expensive, drawn out and 
inefficient. After the expense and delay, usually only a small amount remains for distribution to creditors. 
This lack of effectiveness, and the institutional inefficiencies and obstacles, seem to lead many creditors 
to opt out of the system and resolve their disputes with creditors through informal means.
ii Systemically, 
this leaves a gap in the ability of creditors to engage  in collective resolution of debt and ensure fairness 
and maximization of asset recovery. There is a   need in the MENA region for significant, serious 
investment in training of professionals and developing institutional infrastructure for insolvency.  
 
 In DoingBusiness 2010, the regional results for Closing a Business reflect the underdevelopment of 
insolvency in the MENA region. For MENA, the recovery rate on debt when closing a business is 29.9 
cents on the dollar, compared to 68.6 cents for OECD countries. The time it takes to close a business is 
3.5 years in MENA, compared to 1.7 in OECD, almost twice as long.
iii Many MENA countries report 
even longer time periods than 3.5 years. It also costs, on average, twice as much to close a business in 
MENA as in OECD—it costs 14.1 cents on the dollar in MENA, as opposed to 8.4 cents in OECD states. 





1.1.Insolvency and the Debtor-Creditor Regime 
 
Insolvency  and  Secured  Transactions  systems  are  intrinsically  related  areas  of  a  country’s 
commercial  legal  regime.  Both  secured  transactions  and  insolvency  support  predictability  in  credit 
markets. Secured transactions law provides an individual creditor protection by allowing the creditor to 
insure repayment through access to collateral. Insolvency protects the entire pool of creditors, ensuring 
fair treatment through collective resolution of all debts held by creditors of a particular debtor, when that 
debtor is in financial distress. The way that insolvency treats a secured lender‟s claim can either support 
or undermine the effectiveness of a secured transaction system. If insolvency effectively eliminates the 
security interest of the creditor, then lenders will not consider collateral to be a reliable safety net for 
protecting their interests while lending. On the other hand, the inclusion of secured creditors‟ collateral in 
the insolvency proceeding is often necessary to allow rehabilitation of debtors. The balance between 
strengthening the secured transactions regime and allowing debtor sufficient flexibility and relief from 
creditor demands to reorganize, is important in designing or redesigning the insolvency system during 
reform. 
 
Insolvency is a vital part of the creditor-debtor regime in a country and, in many countries, 
developed as a counterweight to systems of secured credit. Historically, in many countries, secured 
creditors would enforce their rights against a debtor in financial distress, bilaterally. Insolvency 
proceedings would then deal with the remaining assets and creditors in a collective process. Over time, 
insolvency proceedings have come to be understood as much more complex than this, principally in the 
Checks, Commerce, and the Criminalization of Debt 
Checks in modern western legal systems are generally considered simple negotiable instruments to transfer 
money between bank accounts. Checks play a much larger role in commerce in the Middle East. They serve 
as personal guarantees of re-payment, not unlike a form of quasi-collateral whose value shifts based on the 
fortune, and bank account, of a debtor. Banks often request signed checks when giving personal loans, and 
small and medium-size businesses often require them to guarantee payment for large purchases. Landlords 
sometimes insist on more than one postdated check from tenants as a security deposit. In Egypt, litigation over 
checks, and collection efforts based on checks, are ubiquitous. Forgery is the general defense and thus, 
handwriting experts are a common feature of Egyptian commercial proceedings. In some jurisdictions in the 
Middle East, the penalty for bouncing a check is prison. The New York Times reported on the problem in Dubai in 
a September 11, 2009 article, “For a Bounced Check in Dubai, the Penalty Can be Years Behind Bars”. 
Criminalization of debt, particularly bounced checks, has given landlords, banks and other creditors in Dubai the 
formidable ability to send someone to jail with a single document showing a check has been returned for 
insufficient fund. This has led to the imprisonment of legitimate but struggling businesspeople. There is no 
viable system for relieving financial distress; Dubai’s legal structures simply have not kept pace with its 
development as a commercial center. Thus the absence of structures that allow bankruptcy relief or a 
rescheduled repayment schedule, has led expatriates to flee in the face of debt rather than face 
imprisonment. Fear of imprisonment for debts is suggested significantly inhibit risk-taking and investment. 3 
 
area of reorganization of the debtor so that it can emerge from financial distress in a more viable state. 
Today, a healthy insolvency system provides predictability to debtors and creditors in case of financial 
distress while balancing liquidation and reorganization.  
 
While it is important to note that insolvency is, emphatically, not simply a mechanism for secured 
creditor enforcement (indeed, in most economies, unsecured trade credit is, by far, more likely to be 
the  lifeblood  of  commerce),  it  is  important  that  an  insolvency  regime  recognizes  and  supports 
continuation of pre-insolvency rights of creditors in relation to their collateral. While political and 
social considerations will always be a factor, the ability to unwind secured transactions in an insolvency 
proceeding should be minimized. This is particularly important in relation to secured creditors.  It is 
important that their collateral is a reliable source of collection, even in the case of insolvency. At the same 
time,  secured  creditors  need  incentives  to  support reorganization  of  viable  companies. To  the  extent 
possible within the context of allowing debtor rehabilitation and maximization of return on assets, the 
insolvency regime should maintain claims based on commercial bargains, including secured transactions, 
and should avoid assigning priority to claims that are not.  
1.2.Methodology 
 
World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditors’ Rights Systems  
 
The analysis in this chapter considers MENA countries’ insolvency systems in the context of the 
World Bank Principles’ articulated best practice standards. The World Bank Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditors‟ Rights Systems (“World Bank Principles”) were developed in 2001 and revised 
in 2005 and are the global standards for insolvency and debtor-creditor systems. Partner organizations, 
international  experts,  and  the  international  community  were  all  consulted,  so  that  the  World  Bank 
Principles represent an international consensus on best practices in insolvency and creditor rights. The 
World  Bank  uses  them  for,  inter  alia,  benchmarking  the  effectiveness  of  countries‟  insolvency  and 
creditors‟  rights  system.  In  addition,  they  offer  guidance  to  policymakers  who  want  to  establish  a 
functional system for healthy debtor-creditor relations. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law provides further supporting details for implementation and design of systems. 
 
Sources of information, gaps 
 
Several sources were consulted in the preparation of this chapter. The information contained in this 
report consists largely of information gathered from a May 2009 survey, coauthored by the World Bank, 
together with the Hawkamah Institute, the OECD and INSOL International, with the significant assistance 
of international expert, Neil Cooper. Field research was also conducted by the author of this report in 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt and the UAE between 2008 and 2010. Other written information 
that was available on individual countries is cited herein where used.  
1.3.Scope of chapter 
 
This chapter covers non-bank, non-household, commercial insolvency. The focus is on the way that 
MENA countries address companies who are in financial distress, those who cannot pay their debts. 
There is a discussion of features of legal infrastructure that may prevent insolvency filings, and the 4 
 
procedures  that  ensue  once  an  insolvency  case,  most  often  referred  to  as  bankruptcy,  is  filed. 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the region, rather than individual 
country-by-country  analysis.  As  a  result,  the  focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  drawing  region-wide 
observations about some of the strengths and weaknesses of insolvency regimes and is not intended to 
obviate the need for detailed, in-country diagnostic review to better inform the policy reform process. 
2.  Insolvency Proceedings  
 
In the MENA region, there is varying use and understanding of insolvency. In countries that have 
had an insolvency regime in place, the most developed practice seems to be as a tool for collection by 
creditors,  and  for  winding  up  companies.  In  some  countries,  there  is  very  little  if  any  use  of  the 
insolvency system. In other countries, there is no insolvency law to be used. 
 
There are countries that do not have an insolvency law. , Yemen, Iran and Iraq fall in that category. 
Jordan  does  not  have  a  cohesive  bankruptcy  law  but  there  is  a  significant  practice  in  winding  up 
companies that draws on provisions from several laws and which has developed piecemeal over many 
years, and broader reform is underway.
v Winding up of companies in Jordan relies on the provisions for 
liquidation in the Jordanian companies‟ legislation, along with other provisions in other laws, causing 
significant conflict and difficulty for judges.
vi Palestine, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia report very low 
usage of their bankruptcy systems. In Palestine, the “Hanafi Fekh”, a school of Islamic jurisprudence, 
constitutes the civil law and is regarded as more reliable and enforceable than regular courts, and thus 
more widely used. In Qatar, the provisions were only promulgated in 2006 and there has been no judicial 
consideration of them so far. In Saudi Arabia, neither debtors nor creditors use the system due to its 
inefficiencies and investigation procedures that vary widely from one district to another.
vii 
 
There has been movement to modernize bankruptcy regimes. Jordan has a draft insolvency law. 
Egypt undertook bankruptcy law reform in recent years.
viii Morocco and Tunisia were described by the 
authors of an IMF working paper to have made the most progress in the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) in moving toward modernization of bankruptcy regimes, by adding 




An insolvency procedure should be widely accessible. Debtors should be able to file easily and obtain 
legal  protections  swiftly.    Ideally  all  commercial  enterprises  are  eligible,  including  state-owned 
enterprises.
x Creditors should also be able to file, with appropriate opportunity for debtors to object in 
order to protect debtors from inappropriate creditor harassment.  In addition, a ll types of businesses, 
including micro and small businesses, should have access to the insolvency law .    Micro  and  small 
enterprises play an important role in the region and a significant number of these enterprises are so small, 
perhaps household enterprises and sole proprietorships, that they may not be incorporated as limited-
liability entities. To the extent that a bankruptcy law is part of the „companies law‟ regime and therefore 5 
 
requires  a  business  to  be  a  „company‟  in  order  to  be  covered  by  the  law,  many  enterprises,  and  a 
significant portion of economic activity and employment will operate without any access to insolvency 
procedures to exit the market efficiently. The lack of efficient exit mechanisms, particularly regarding 
individual  entrepreneurs,  inhibits  market  entry  as  such  entrepreneurs  cannot  be  released  from  debts 
relating to previous failures.  
 
The unilateral right of all debtors to access the insolvency law is generally found throughout the 
region. The requirements for filing, and the entities that may file a bankruptcy petition against/on behalf 
of a company vary among countries. Kuwait appears to have broad access for debtors other than state-
owned companies. In Yemen, though there is no insolvency law, either debtors or creditors may file for 
winding up of a company by obtaining an order of the Attorney General.  In Saudi Arabia and in Egypt, a 
corporate  debtors‟  application  requires  the  consent  of  shareholders,  who  must apply  to the court.  In 
Jordan, the General Assembly of the company takes the decision to liquidate (there is no full bankruptcy 
proceeding). DIFC allows all companies and limited liability partnerships in the jurisdiction of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre to avail themselves of bankruptcy procedures. Debtors and creditors can 
file easily.





Several MENA countries’ laws allow “traders” or “merchants” to file, whether they are companies 
or individuals, thus expanding access beyond corporate entities. For example, Oman, Egypt, and 
Morocco, allow traders, or merchants, to file, whether they are individuals engaged in commercial 
activity, or companies.
xiii Interestingly, Morocco also includes “artisans” in the list of those commercial 
entities eligible for bankruptcy.
xiv  In Jordan, access to the bankruptcy system is through the Companies 
Control Department (CCD), so that companies that are not subject to CCD supervision likely will not 
participate in the insolvency system.
xv However, the new draft law in Jordan, which is proposed to be a 
comprehensive bankruptcy law, includes merchants, registered/incorporated and 
unregistered/unincorporated, and thus if passed will provide broad access to an insolvency regime created 
















Dubai World and Decree Incorporating DIFC Modern Insolvency Law Demonstrates the 
Importance of Insolvency Law 
The DIFC is an interesting laboratory for the importance and operation of insolvency law. 
Recently Dubai World, a sovereign wealth fund, became insolvent, unable to service its debts. The 
Dubai government has passed a Decree that creates a special tribunal for the Dubai World 
restructuring. It will apply DIFC law, even though Dubai World was created outside of DIFC 
jurisdiction. The Dubai government’s extraordinary action indicates that it recognizes the value of 
using a system based on international best practice that is familiar to international investors and 
creditors, but may raise concerns about predictability and transparency.  
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State-owned companies, however, are frequently excluded from bankruptcy proceedings. Egypt, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE exclude state-owned companies from bankruptcy proceedings.
xvi There 
may be valid policy reasons for excluding state -owned enterprises from ordinary corporate insolvency 
regimes, particularly in respect of strategic industries such as mining, defense and aviation. Nevertheless, 
the distortive market impact of excluding such businesses from ordinary commercial laws should be 
acknowledged in the policy-making process.  
 
Creditors can file in most of the MENA countries. Historically, in many developing countries, and 
particularly where reorganization and other advantages to debtors have not yet been developed in the law, 
creditors initiate bankruptcy filings, as a collection tool. By contrast, in countries such as the U.S., the 
vast majority of filings are by the debtor, and creditor filings are rare. Creditors can file freely in court in 
UAE,  Kuwait,  Morocco, Egypt,  Lebanon  and-  Oman.  Saudi creditors  must apply  to  the Ministry  of 
Commerce or the Diwan Al Mazalan Board of Grievances to initiate insolvency proceedings. In Qatar, 
there are no provisions allowing creditors to file.
xvii Creditors do not enjoy the same freedom to file in 
Jordan as in other MENA countries, w here creditor-initiated filings have generally been the norm. For 
creditor-initiated  filings  in  Jordan,  the  Companies  Control  Department  (CCD)  commences  the 
compulsory liquidations, and other creditors do not appear to have the right to commence a bankrupt cy 
proceeding, though they may bring the debtor‟s situation to the CCD‟s attention.
xviii 
2.2. Avoidable transactions/fraudulent conveyances/Contract cancellation  
 
The ability to unwind inappropriate pre-filing transactions effectively is an important aspect of 
preventing  fraud  and  abuse  by  creditors  and  debtor  management  alike.  In  many  developing 
countries, there is a significant public policy concern expressed by reformers and lawmakers 
xix that the 
law should prevent asset stripping and prevent abuse of bankrup tcy process for illicit gain. The trustee 
and court should have the ability to set aside transactions that were intended to defraud creditors, or that 
constitute an unfair favoring of one creditor over another, in violation of his priority rights. This is  a 
significant tool in the fight to reduce asset stripping or „tunneling‟ out of a company on the eve of 
insolvency. International best practice standards also prefer that contracts that have not been substantially 
performed, and leases, should be cancellable in a bankruptcy proceeding, if they are not in the economic 
interest of the debtor.
xx 
 
Preferences and fraudulent conveyances 
 
In most bankruptcy regimes, there is a suspect period, during which payments are presumed to be 
preferential  and  may  be  set  aside/cancelled.  This  period  should  be  reasonably  short  in  respect  to 
general creditors, and should avoid disrupting normal commercial and credit relations.  Transfers of assets 
that prevent fairness to creditors and/or render the debtor insolvency, or are done while it is insolvent, 
also called fraudulent transfers or conveyances, should be avoidable/cancellable.
xxi 
 
One of the issues that can slow down cases in some countries is that the date from which the suspect 
period is calculated is not the date of filing, but the date of cessation of payments. The date of 
cessation can be a matter of controversy in a case, and thus determining it not only slows down the 
proceeding, but adds a fair amount of uncertainty as to the preference period
xxii. In contrast, in countries 
like the U.S. where the filing date is the point of determination for the preference period, the time frame 7 
 
will be immediately apparent as soon as the case is filed. There is an added certainty and predictability to 
a more firm date from which to go backward to unwind transactions.   
 
Making  the  preference  period  more  predictable  would  contribute  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
bankruptcy system. Using the date of filing, or clarifying simple standards for determining the date the 
preference period begins, would add to the efficiency and effectiveness of the bankruptcy procedure in 
ensuring creditor rights are protected from inappropriate payments that unfairly prefer a creditor out of his 
priority order. Uncertainty in the process, as shown in table 3, is one of the biggest weaknesses in the 
region.  In Jordan, for actions undertaken „with the intent to defraud‟, there is no time limit, though such 
actions  to  unwind  fraudulent  conveyances  are  rarely  investigated.
xxiii  In Morocco and Lebanon, the 
suspect period is from the date of cessation of payments to the date of the court decision ordering the 
commencement of proceedings, not to exceed eighteen months. Egypt and Kuwait follow a similar 
formula, though their suspect periods may last up to two years. In Qatar, the court may go back two years 
from the commencement of bankruptcy.
xxivUAE allows transactions to be avoided and set aside as 
preferences. Saudi Arabia does not have preference actions, but fraudulent transactions may be cancelled. 
Yemen has no provisions for the setting aside of transactions.
xxv 
 
Treatment/Cancellation of Contracts 
 
Cancelling contracts is a part of the bankruptcy law of several of the countries. The DIFC allows the 
court  to  set  aside  transactions  contrary  to  creditors  interests,  and  the  liquidator  may  terminate 
unperformed contracts. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait also allow the administrator to terminate 
onerous contracts. 
xxvi 
2.3.  Priority of creditors: clearly delineated, and protected, security interests preserved.  
 
The rights of creditors and priorities of claims established prior to insolvency should be upheld in 
order  to  preserve  the  legitimate  expectations  of  commercial  actors.  Security  interests  should  be 
preserved. While there will be some new claims in an insolvency that take priority due to compelling 
interests, such as costs of the administration of the estate, in general, the insolvency process should not 
subvert ordinary creditor priorities as they would exist outside of bankruptcy. Such subversion introduces 
a level of uncertainty in day-to-day commercial transactions. At the same time, it must be recognized that 
bankruptcy, by its nature, is a public and collective process that will involve the imposition of public 
policy  priorities  on  what  were  previously  private  transactions.  It  is  conceivable,  for  example,  that a 
country that privileges the private sector with favorable tax treatment may wish to make up for the lack of 
public funds available to support unemployed workers by privileging such workers in insolvency. The 
over-arching issue of importance is that the priority rules be clear, predictable and transparent.
xxvii Many 
OECD countries provide for the priority of certain very specific claims, such as employee social security 
contributions deducted at source by employers. This reflects public policy that recognizes the importance 
of some social claims as being greater than the need to ensure secured creditor primacy. As such, the 
notion of „absolute priority‟ is a rarity, even in wealthy countries. 
 
The pre-bankruptcy rights of secured creditors are often not well protected in the region. Rights 
that are most often given priority as a matter of public policy over pre-bankruptcy creditors‟ rights are 
costs of the court, taxes, costs of the estate, and employee/servant debts. Morocco,
xxviii Jordan, Egypt, 8 
 
Qatar  and  Kuwait  prioritize  the  public  policy  exceptions  over  creditors‟  rights,  including  secured 
creditors. Saudi Arabia prioritizes only liquidation costs, employee wages, rent and wife‟s dowry. Egypt 
also gives rent a priority. However in Saudi Arabia secured creditor rights are not subordinated to the 
public policy exemptions; the funds from their collateral are held in trust by the administrator and paid to 
the secured creditor after the collateral is sold.
xxix Clarity of priority is a problem in Jordan, where the 
Companies Law sets out liquidation expenses, employee payments, taxes and rents as being first in 
priority over other creditors, seemingly secured creditors, though the issue is not clear, and subject to 
debate. 
xxx It is  also unclear in Palestine whether or not the stay on creditor action restricts secured 
creditors from executing on collateral; thus it is not clear if the secured creditors‟ rights and priority in 
proceeds of collateral are preserved in insolvency.
xxxi 
2.4.Stay on Creditor Action 
 
To  prevent  premature  dismemberment  of  the  estate,  upon  commencement  of  bankruptcy 
unauthorized disposition of the debtor’s assets should be automatically prohibited, and creditor 
actions to enforce their rights or remedies against the debtor’s assets should be suspended. Such a 
period is often referred to as a stay, a moratorium, or suspension of proceedings. Ideally, the stay should 
be as wide as possible to maximize the value of asset recoveries, but there should be a procedure to lift 
the stay in case of deterioration of secured creditors‟ protection/asset value.
xxxii Some commentators argue 
that  secured  creditors  should  be  excluded  from  any  such  stay.  International  standards,  however, 
recommend  inclusion  of  secured  creditors  for  at  least  a  limited  time,  to  potentially  reorganize  or 
maximize the recovery through sale of the entire business, with corresponding quick transitions into 
liquidation if the rescue of the business is shown to be unlikely.
xxxiiiIndeed, it would be unlikely that a 
company could be successfully restructured if there was not a comprehensive stay, if even for a brief 
time. The right of secured creditors vis a vis such a stay can be balanced by giving them the legal right to 
seek the lifting of the stay, if they can show risk of severe economic harm. 
 
The moratorium is used widely in many MENA jurisdictions. Jordan, Morocco, DIFC, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Lebanon,  Saudi  Arabia,  UAE,  and  Yemen  prohibit  unauthorized  disposition  of  assets  after  the 
commencement  of  liquidation.  Morocco,  Jordan,  Egypt,  Kuwait,  Qatar,  Palestine,  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Yemen impose a stay all creditor action, with certain exceptions for secured creditors .
xxxivIn Jordan, the 
stay lasts 3 months unless the liquidator extends it.
xxxv In Morocco, creditors recover the ability to act on 
the assets affected if there is not action by the insolvency administrator three months from the date of 
commencement of liquidation, or if the proceeding is closed for inadequacy of assets.
xxxvi 
 
Application of Stay/Moratorium to Secured Creditors 
 
When liquidation occurs, it is desirable for secured creditors to be able to enforce directly against 
the assets over which they have security. In Egypt, UAE, Oman, Kuwait secured creditors are allowed 
to  proceed  directly  against  their  collateral.
xxxvii  In Egypt secured creditors must exercise their rights, 
otherwise, if the estate sells the collateral, the secured creditor is paid after the privileged creditors 
described above in Section 3.3 Priority of Creditors.
xxxviii  The liquidator may also restrict secured 
creditors‟ exercise of their rights in order to sell the business as a going concern, though the secured 
creditor may appeal the delay if they are not adequately protected against loss.
xxxix . In Qatar, applying the 
stay to secured creditors is possible but requires court approval. DIFC protects secured creditors‟ rights to 9 
 
the  extent  that  collateral  cannot  be  sold  unencumbered  without  the  secured  creditors‟  permission. 
Palestinian law does not appear clear on this point.
xl 
By contrast, in Moroccoxli, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen, secured creditors will be 




Table 1: Mapping of Liquidation Procedure 


























































Algeria  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  N 
Bahrain  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  N 
Djibouti  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Egypt  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N 
Iran  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Iraq  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Jordan  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  N 
Kuwait  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  - 
Lebanon  -  -  Y  N  -  -  Y  N  N  N 
Libya  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Morocco  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N  - 
Oman    N  Y  Y  Y  -  -  N  N  N 
Qatar  Y    -  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N  - 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Y  Y  N  -  Y  Y  N  N  N  N 
Syria  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  N  -  - 
Tunisia  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  N 





Y  -  Y  Y  Y  -  -  N  N  - 
Yemen  Y  Y  Y  N  -  -  N  N  N  - 
 
The original, and currently still the most frequent use of bankruptcy is as a means to liquidation. 
Assets of a non-viable company in financial distress need to be redistributed into the economy, and 
human capital (owners, employees) redeployed as soon as possible to economic productivity. 
                                                           
1 Yes if there are no exclusions for state-owned companies, no other broad exclusions, and all registered companies 
may file. 
2 Yes if sale is not restricted to court/public auction. The overall effectiveness or experience on the ground is not a 
part of this criterion. 
3 Yes if priority does not exceed the common priorities of court/legal costs, taxes, employee payments, and debtor‟s 
sustenance expenses.  
4 Yes if the insolvency administrators are not widely described as competent, and they are not considered an 
important obstacle to effective bankruptcy implementation, or described as largely lacking integrity 10 
 
 
Conversion to liquidation, if reorganization is not viable, should be swift and efficient.  
If  reorganization  is  attempted,  but  fails,  the  conversion  to  liquidation  should  be  swift,  preferably 
automatic. In MENA countries, reorganization is rarely attempted in the formal system. Therefore, this 
criterion is not often invoked. Nevertheless, in most of the countries that allow reorganization, conversion 
to liquidation is swift, often triggered automatically. Triggers are the failure to reach a composition, 
settlement or agreement, or fraud or negligence (failure to keep adequate financial records, for example) 
of the debtor being uncovered.  In Kuwait, creditors must petition for conversion. Where the judiciary is 
slow, conversion can face the same delays as any other aspect of the bankruptcy procedure. The majority 
of bankruptcies in the MENA region are liquidations. 
 
No MENA country can claim an efficient liquidation process by international standards.  Despite 
being the most commonly used procedure in the region, liquidation is a painstaking process in most, with 
varying degrees of speed involved. An efficient liquidation procedure involves swift appointment of the 
administrator,  maximum  recovery  on  assets,  inclusion  of  all  assets  in  the  estate,  prevention  of 
deterioration  of  assets,  safeguards  to  prevent  asset  stripping  and  fraud,  a  market  for  assets,  swift 
procedure to sell assets, and fair, swift distribution of proceeds. Delay severely deteriorates the value of 
the assets and the rights of the creditors, 
xliii  
 
Delay  and  inefficiency  plague  the  insolvency  systems  of  most  of  the  MENA  countries.  Sales 
procedures for assets are not efficient, often requiring auctions with cumbersome procedures, such as in 
Kuwait and Egypt, or other detailed, time-consuming procedures to “protect” debtor‟s assets such as in 
Lebanon
xliv. They are often subject to appeal by recalcitrant parties and delays in finalization.
xlv  Among 
MENA countries, efficient recovery and maximization of assets is not the no rm. Bankruptcy is a last 
resort.  Creditors often expect little or no recovery and use a bankruptcy declaration (and the liquidation 
consequences to debtor, and attendant loss of civil rights) as a threat to motivate payment. Bankruptcy 
then becomes a tool for creditor collection, essentially a bilateral dispute over continuation or dismissal of 
the bankruptcy based on satisfying a debt. 
 
Criminalization of insolvency/bankruptcy, and the fraud suspicion toward debtors, also serves to 
slow down proceedings. Bankruptcy in many MENA countries can lead to criminal prosecution, and 
civil penalties such as loss of freedom of movement (the court can take a debtor‟s passport) or loss of 
ability to manage a company.
xlvi The laws and systems tend to view debtors as wrong doers, rather than 
economic actors in financial distress. There is a fear of fraud and abuse of the system, based on the 
criminal view of insolvency, but also based on asset -concealment, asset stripping, and defrauding of 
creditors that has occurred in many developing countries. Many times, the fear of such fraud/abuse can 
lead to scrutiny of sale prices, cumbersome, inefficient auction procedures, and the over -availability of 
appeals of transactions within the bankruptcy (described above).
xlvii  These procedural obstacles slow 
down the bankruptcy, but often fail to effectively prevent fraud —rather, they lead to delay and loss of 
asset value. 
The MENA Report findings support the conclusions drawn. In the report, Egypt and Kuwait report 
slow, protracted procedures. Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE report low usage of the 
bankruptcy system. Yemen and Iran do not have formal insolvency laws.
xlviii DoingBusiness provides 
further evidence of slow systems in the region.  DoingBusiness 2010 descriptions of time f or closing a 11 
 
business and levels of recovery for countries not covered by the MENA Report are reported in the table 
below:  
















Algeria  2.5 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Bahrain  2.5 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Djibouti  5 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Egypt  4.2 years   3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Iran  4.5 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Iraq  No practice  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Jordan   4.3 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Kuwait  4.2 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Lebanon  4 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Libya  No 
information 
3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Morocco  1.8 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Oman  4 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Qatar  2.8 years   3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Saudi Arabia  1.5 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Syria  4.1 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Tunisia  1.3 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
UAE  5.1 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
West Bank & Gaza  No practice   3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 
Yemen  3 years  3.5 years  1.7 
years 
2.9 years  3.3 years  4.5 years  3.4 years 12 
 












South Asia  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Algeria  41.7   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Bahrain  63.2   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Egypt  16.8  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Djibouti  15.9   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Iran  23.1   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Iraq   No practice  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Kuwait  34.5  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Jordan  27.3  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Lebanon  19.0   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Libya   No practice  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Morocco  35.1  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Qatar   52.7  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Oman   35.1   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Saudi Arabia   37.5   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Syria  29.5   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Tunisia  52.3   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
UAE   10.2  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
West Bank & Gaza  No practice  29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
Yemen   28.6   29.9   68.6   31.6  26.8  20.4  17 
 
 
The DoingBusiness results show some anomalies, which bear further analysis. The DoingBusiness 
results suggest that some countries, such as Bahrain with a 2.5 year timeframe for closing a business, 
which compares favorably to the OECD average of 1.7 years, may be more advanced than other sources 
on MENA countries would suggest.  It is important to remember, however, that this metric tracks secured 
creditor recoveries and that even the seemingly positive results may  mask a  bankruptcy system that 
returns little or nothing to unsecured creditors.  
 
There are several countries that fare particularly poorly compared to the averages of other regions, 
and even in comparison to fellow MENA countries. One of the main reasons for the lag in ratings for 
MENA countries, both individually and generally, seems to be, simply, that there has been less reform in 
the insolvency area in these MENA countries than in many others. Especially in OECD countries laws are 
continually revised in response to their performance in the market. In many ECA countries, as well, there 
have been extensive attempts at reform over the last two decades that helped to modernize their laws and 
improve recovery rates and shorten the time involved in proceedings.  Many of the MENA country 
insolvency laws date back a decade, or even several decades. As noted, some, such as Jordan, Yemen, 
Iran,  do  not  have  comprehensive  bankruptcy  laws.  As  previously  discussed,  they  do  not  meet 
international standards for best practices. Those that have undertaken significant reform, such as Morocco 
and Tunisia, fare better in the rankings in the Doing Business report. 13 
 
 
Additionally, the courts in many MENA countries have not been modernized to the same degree as 
others,  so  that  case  backlogs,  and  cumbersome  procedures  slow  down  proceedings,  which  also 
lowers recovery, as assets deteriorate over time. Lack of experience with successfully and efficiently 
resolving bankruptcy cases, among judges, and sometimes, among the professionals responsible for the 
cases, also appears to be another impediment to efficiency. Reforming laws is a long-term proposition, 
and modernizing courts with sufficient resources, and modern case management procedures is an even 
longer-term proposition.  In much of MENA, the process has hardly begun. 
 
Debtor protection: Can debtor object to creditor filing?  
 
In order to ensure debtor’s rights, the debtor should have a chance to object to filing. In MENA, 
where  bankruptcy  is  often  a  collection  tool,  insolvency  filings  are  often  by  the  creditor  against  the 
debtor.
xlix  Especially  given  the  severe  consequences  of  bankruptcy  filing  in  most  of  the  MENA 
countries—a bankruptcy declaration often imposes restriction on debtor‟s civil rights has been likened to 
“death” by commentators in Egypt—a check on creditor‟s ability to put the debtor in bankruptcy is 
necessary. Generally, the court certifies the insolvency by whatever test is provided in the law: cessation 
of payments, balance sheet (assets vs. liabilities), etc.   
 
Many  countries  either  explicitly  allow  debtor  to  object,  or  try  to  protect  debtor  through  an 
assessment of his insolvency before initiating the case. Kuwait explicitly allows debtor objection to a 
filing. In the other countries, while information is not available as to an explicit right to object to the 
filing, since the  
determination of insolvency needs to be reached by the court, and debtor provides the information, that 
process should provide some protection for a debtor against an unjustified bankruptcy filing.
l In Jordan, 
with the myriad laws governing the insolvency system , there is not a clear right of a debtor to object to a 
filing.  The  Jordanian  Companies  Control  Department  (CCD)  controls  the  access  to  insolvency 
proceedings,  and  government  entities,  in  addition  to  the  courts,  control  accessibilit y.
li  Jordan‟s 
arrangement is unusual, both in the region and worldwide. In Palestine, though the bankruptcy procedure 
is rarely used, there is no formal test of insolvency, and it is not clear if and based on what standards the 
debtor could object. Saudi Arabia also has no clear test; competent administrative bodies are required to 
investigate debtor‟s estate, and there is no consistency in practice. Consequently, insolvency procedures 
are rarely used in Saudi Arabia. In Qatar, as previously stated, creditors cannot file, which is unusual for 
the region, and indeed, worldwide.
lii 
 
2.6.   Reorganization 
 
Reorganization is one of the most important features of a modern insolvency regime. In many countries 
bankruptcy  has  historically  been  synonymous  with  liquidation.  In  a  modern  system,  the  insolvency 
system allows a potentially viable debtor company to attempt to reorganize and survive its financial 
distress in order to continue operations. Reorganization can help to keep companies that are productive 
but  only  need time  and  some  legal  protections  to  survive,  to  continue  operating  productively  in the 
economy.  However,  many  companies  will  not  be  able  to  rise  above  their  financial  troubles  and 
reorganize. When a reorganization fails, the conversion to liquidation and ensuing liquidation should be 






Improving the Efficiency of Liquidation in MENA 
Liquidation is not considered efficient in most of region. In order to improve the 
speed and efficiency of the procedure as well as maximize return, countries in 
the region should consider: 
  Simplifying the procedure to open a case, so that any review is done 
within a very short time frame, no more than two weeks so that 
liquidation can begin 
  Simplify the procedures to dispose of assets, emphasizing the need to 
maximize value, with appropriate, but not overzealous concern for 
preventing fraud. 
  Enact reasonable, yet efficient time deadlines for the bankruptcy case, 
for the overall liquidation and for disposal of assets 
  Enhance the capacity of relevant professionals, such as judges, 
attorneys and businesspeople, through training in the economic 
principles of bankruptcy and insolvency, valuation and maximization of 
assets 
  Professionalize insolvency administrators through appropriate training 
and supervision (discussed further in Part 4 Institutions Implementing 
the Insolvency System) 
 
Both  the  2005  World  Bank’s  Principles  for  Effective  Insolvency  and  Creditor 
Rights Systems, and the 2004 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
provide  further  detailed  guidance  on  designing  systems  in  accordance  with 





Table 2: Mapping of Reorganization 
Country  Reorganization 






































  Y/N  Y/N  Y/N  Y/N
6  Y/N  Y/N  Y/N
7  Y/N  -  - 
Algeria  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  N  N 
Bahrain  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  Y  N 
Djibouti  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Egypt  Y  minimal  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  N 
Iran  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Iraq  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  Y  N 
Jordan  Y  Minimal  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  -  - 
Kuwait  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y  -  N  -  - 
Lebanon  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  -  Y  N 
Morocco  Y  Y  Y  Y  y  N  -  N  -  - 
Oman  Y  Minimal  N  Y  -  y  -  N  Y  N 
Qatar  N  N  -  -  -  -  -  N  Y  - 
Saudi 
Arabia 
N  Y  -  Y  Y  Y  -  N  Y  N 
Syria  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Tunisia  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  Y  N 




N  N  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Yemen  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  -  - 
                                                           
6 No if debtor management is allowed to stay in place during reorganization 
7 The question presumes a stay, if there is no stay on creditor action, No 16 
 
Reorganization Law: practice, incidence of successful reorganizations 
 
There are few reorganizations in MENA countries, despite the fact that many MENA countries 
have reorganization provisions in their laws. The provisions are mostly in the form of conciliation 
procedure that allow a delay in the declaration of bankruptcy in order to attempt an amicable settlement 
with creditors. There is a lack of expertise on corporate rescue, and often a lack of capacity in the courts 
to make the reorganization processes that are in the laws effective. Moreover, within these provisions, 
many of the key elements of modern reorganization systems, such as realistic timelines, provision for 
preparation of plans and adequate disclosure of debtor financial information, adequate provision for and 
encouragement  of  creditor  participation  and  negotiation,  and  provision  for  operating  funds  through 
priority  for  post-petition  financing,  are  missing.  In  France,  French  law  contains  similar  provisions. 
However,  new,  more  detailed  provisions  passed  in  2005,  that  took  effect  in  2006  added  a  more 
sophisticated “safeguard” reorganization proceeding to the law, which stimulated more reorganization. 
Immediately  upon  implementation  the  safeguard  process  allowed  a  high-profile  restructuring  of 
Eurotunnel,  the  undersea  rail  operator;  others  continue  to  follow  suit.
liv  No such modernization of 
provisions to encourage reorganization has been successfully undertaken in the MENA countries.  While 
many countries laws‟ were originally modeled on the French law, they have not been revised to keep pace 
with the changes the French have found necessary to effectuate reorganization. 
 
The other, perhaps most important shortcoming in MENA countries that inhibits reorganization is 
lack of institutional capacity. For reorganization to be successful, the professionals involved, such as 
administrators, insolvency practitioners, judges, must not only be knowledgeable about restructuring, they 
need to be flexible. Institutions, particularly courts, in MENA are not flexible, as previously stated, they 
tend to be bureaucratic and formalistic. They inhibit rather than support a process that by its nature 
requires flexibility and dynamism. Nor does there appear to be a body of professionals--restructuring 
experts, trustees/insolvency professionals experienced with creditor negotiation and debt restructuring, or 
judges--that  can  compensate  for  the  institutional  inertia.  In  short,  the  lack  of  experience  with 
reorganization, seems to be reinforcing the lack of its practice. 
 
Several MENA countries have some provision in the law for coming to agreement with creditors in 
order to prevent a bankruptcy.  Morocco
lv, Egypt, DIFC, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, allow conciliation 
(often  called  “composition”)  or  settlement  procedures  starting  the  day  of  the  commencement  of  the 
proceedings.  The declaration of bankruptcy is delayed while the conciliation is attempted.
lvi In Morocco a 
four-month period (analogous to the French law) is allowed during which the debtor attempts to reach an 
amicable settlement with creditors.
lvii Egypt has a similar conciliation procedure.
lviii Jordan allows the 
liquidator to reach agreement with creditors of a public company, including the power to bind dissenting 
creditors, and also has a composition procedure for non-corporate traders/merchants that allows a debtor 
to propose a settlement to creditors.
lix Tunisia is reported to have reorganization provisions, without 
specific time  guidelines, and  without  the  ability  of  dissenting  creditors to appeal, though  further 
information on the structure of the provisions is not readily available.
lx  In Saudi Arabia and UAE there 
are seldom-used procedures by which a settlement with the debtor and creditors may be reached. In Saudi 
Arabia the process is controlled by an appointed government agent. UAE also has such a procedure but 17 
 




Ultimately, however, the core elements of a modern restructuring law are missing, even from these 
conciliation provisions. Such missing key elements include: provisions for the preparation of a plan of 
arrangement and the ability to obtain financing during the reorganization. As a result, the conciliation 
procedures across the region are rarely used to successfully rehabilitate distressed companies. 
 
Debtor management remaining in place vs. an insolvency administrator 
 
Leaving the management of the debtor company in reorganization in place can be a controversial 
issue. 
 In the U.S. there is a strong practice of leaving debtor management in place, as the current management 
is most likely to understand the business well enough to reorganize it. Other approaches are to either cede 
total control to an independent insolvency representative administrator/receiver, or to have the debtor 
management continue under the supervision of an insolvency representative administrator/receiver. In the 
case of incompetent or negligent management, or fraud on the part of management, management should 
be shifted to the insolvency representative.
lxii 
 
The debtor is allowed to participate in management of the company during reorganization in many 
MENA countries. Perhaps this is accepted, despite the suspicion culturally shown debtors, because a 
potential insolvency is not a “bankruptcy”, with all the attendant consequences. Nor is it as formal as a 
reorganization procedure in a more modern law. It is a “preliminary” procedure while the bankruptcy 
declaration is postponed to try conciliation/reorganization among debtor and creditors. However, none of 
the  countries  leave  the  debtor  completely  in  charge  without  the  supervision  of  a  trustee/insolvency 
administrator.  In  Jordan,  Egypt,  Kuwait  and  Lebanon,  debtor  management  and  an  insolvency 
administrator in a supervisory role manage a company in the process of a conciliation/reorganization. The 
degree of powers of each varies.
lxiii In Jordan, the court will enumerate the division of powers in the order 
appointing the trustee before a liquidation decision, and the powers of the liquidators after the decision 




Some  countries  remove  debtor  management  from  company  operations.  Oman  and  Saudi  Arabia 
appear  to  leave  no  role  for  debtor  management  once  the  case  has  commenced.
lxv  In Morocco, from 
information available it appears that the trustee/insolvency administrator has complete control of a 
company in the process of reorganization.
lxvi 
 
Does the stay apply to secured creditors in a reorganization? 
 
If secured creditors all claim their collateral, the debtor’s most valuable assets could be decimated, 
making  a  recovery  from  financial  distress  and  successful  reorganization  impossible.  In  a 
reorganization, the viability of the business is the focus. If the secured creditors‟ collateral is necessary for 18 
 
reorganization, a stay on that creditors‟ execution would maximize the chances of reorganization for the 
company (see earlier comments regarding stays of proceedings).
lxvii  
 
Application of the stay to secured creditors in reorganization varies across the region. It appears that 
Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt affirmatively apply the stay to secured creditors in reorganization.
lxviii  In 
Morocco, the stay applies to secured creditors during a liquidation, but it is not clear if it applies during a 
reorganization. In other countries, information is not available as to whether the stay applies differently in 
a reorganization, as opposed to a liquidation (see Section 3.3.1 Stay/Moratorium). 
 
 Creditors input: participation, creditors’ committee, voting on plan, monitoring? 
 
Creditor participation is the key to an effective reorganization. They are stakeholders in the debtor‟s 
estate, and therefore their agreement to a reorganization plan is crucial for its success. Creditors should be 
able  to  effectively  participate  in  the reorganization process.  In  large  cases  with  multiple  creditors, a 
creditors‟ committee is the preferred mechanism to ensure the creditors‟ voice is heard. The law should 
specify the composition, voting, and monitoring rights of the creditors‟ committee.  
 
Despite the fact that the reorganization procedures are seldom used in most countries, many of the 
reorganization  provisions  in  the  region’s  laws  do  explicitly  allow  for  creditor  input.  The  most 
common formula is to require approval of a majority of creditors representing 2/3 of debtors‟ liabilities is 
needed, as in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE. In Jordan, creditors representing 75% of 
the debt owed and the general meeting of the company must approve. Secured creditors do not vote in 
either Jordan or Lebanon.
lxix In Morocco, there is no creditor vote, but creditors have the ability to make 
offers to settle during the four month conciliation period, and are bound by those offers if accepted.
lxx In 
DIFC, despite having the most modern insolvency laws, creditor voting procedures are vague, and a plan 
cannot bind preferential or secured creditors to accept a reduction in their rights.




3.  Informal/Out of Court Reorganization and Workouts 
3.1. Formal support for out-of-court, non-insolvency workouts and restructuring 
 
Financial  crises  often  prompt  countries  to  provide  a  framework  for  out-of-court  workouts  for 
distressed companies, to prevent bankruptcy filings. Out of court workouts can be undertaken when a 
company is in financial distress, but may have a chance of recovery, without a bankruptcy filing, if 
appropriate arrangements can be made among its major creditors.  Out of court workouts can come in 
many forms, including bi-lateral negotiations between debtor and creditors under an agreed, non-binding 
set of guidelines. This approach is often called the “London Approach”. Major lenders such as banks 
Bringing Reorganization to the MENA Region: First Steps 
By and large, reorganization is not widely practiced in the region. In order to promote 
rehabilitation of viable companies, MENA countries’ immediate reform priorities 
should focus on: 
  Decriminalizing bankruptcy 
  Shifting the focus from punishing the debtor and uncovering wrongdoing to to 
rehabilitating debtors in financial distress 
  Developing more detailed, modernized provisions for the reorganization 
procedure, in accordance with international best practice standards, including 
more specific procedures for reorganization plan formation and distribution, 
financial disclosures of debtor, and creditor participation. 
  Enhancing the ability of creditors and debtors to negotiate, through the 
development of alternative dispute resolution, particularly in cases where a 
debtor is dealing with a singular creditor 
  Cultivating a “culture of reorganization” by developing expertise among 
professionals, judges and attorneys in restructuring, and the economics of 
overcoming financial distress 
  Providing training to insolvency administrators on the economic and legal 
aspects of successful restructuring of debt and rehabilitation of debtors. 
 
Both  the  2005  World  Bank’s  Principles  for  Effective  Insolvency  and  Creditor  Rights 
Systems, and the 2004 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law provide further 





agree to a standstill on payment and collection for a period of collective negotiation. Participation in the 
scheme is voluntary, though banks in the UK did commit to the scheme, and a significant practice has 
evolved since the 1970s and through various financial crises through the 1990s.
lxxii  Other forms can 
include government sponsored negotiations or negotiations facilitated by third parties (both of which will 
be discussed below). 
 
The London Approach works best for debtors that have multiple institutional lenders (primarily 
banks) at a senior level. Creditors must believe that negotiating will produce a better result than an 
insolvency filing, in order to motivate them to negotiate.  It is also more effective when the debtor does 
not need relief from trade debts, or the benefits of formal insolvency.
lxxiii In order to support such a 
system, the legal and business regime should allow debt -for-equity swaps, and tax laws should not 
penalize debt restructuring or debt forgiveness. Additionally, the stronger the country‟s overall creditors‟ 
rights and insolvency regime , the more incentive the debtor will have to come to the table to negotiate. 
The parties will be more motivated when the legal system provides the credible threat of debt collection 
by creditors, or referral to liquidation, if there is not a collective resolution.
lxxiv 
 
 In response to the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
promulgated out-of-court workout frameworks, with variations such as the “Bangkok Rules” and 
the “Jakarta Initiative”.
lxxv One major difference between these initiatives and the London Approach is 
that  in these countries, the government/authorities took a more active role in the workout process than the 
London  Approach
lxxvi. All four countries created central bodies that had the authority to identify 
companies in distress and monitor and encourage restructuring. All provided some form mediation and 
arbitration of disputes that arose during the negotiation procedure. The London Approach is much more 
hands-off; any alternative dispute resolution employed will be undertaken at the initiative of the private 
parties, not the government. Moreover, in these Asian countries, unanimous consent of creditors was not 
required for a restructuring plan, a 75% vote was enough.
lxxvii The authors of a recent study of corporate 
debt restructuring during financial crises found that all countries had mixed success with restructuring.
 
lxxviii After reviewing the experience in current systems, including the four born of the Asian crisis, the 
authors concluded that approaches that involved government support, and the establishment of public 
entities to facilitate and/or mediate the corporate restructuring process, were the most likely to produce 
results.
lxxix   
Use of out of court restructuring is not widespread in MENA, though the most recent financial 
crisis has led to high-profile restructurings of large firms. The economic context in some of the 
MENA countries renders the process too complex for ordinary companies. As an example, in Saudi 
Arabia, a significant number of companies have one major financial institution as a credit source, rather 
than  multiple  institutional  creditors.
lxxx  Moreover, there does not seem to be a   cultural practice of 
admitting looming financial disaster for a company, in order to initiate negotiations with its creditors. 
Therefore, in some MENA countries, informal negotiations between debtors and creditors are not the 
norm.
lxxxi  Kuwait has recently bu cked the norm and begun to encourage multi -creditor workouts in 
response to the global financial crisis.  
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Kuwait is specifically encouraging London Approach-style out-of-court restructuring, as evidenced 
by high profile debt restructurings in 2009-2010. In order to facilitate the restructurings, in 2009 the 
Kuwaiti government passed a stimulus package in response to the global financial crisis. The plan aims to 
protect companies from creditors if they file a viable business plan, and the central bank approves the 
advisers for any foreign financial restructuring.
lxxxii The government support appears to have worked; 
Kuwait had more than one high-profile restructuring in 2009-2010. Global Investment House K.S.C (c), a 
Kuwaiti  investment  house  listed  on  both  the  Kuw aiti  and  London  stock  exchanges  finalized  its 
restructuring in early 2010, which included  three year amortizing facilities with each of its 53 lending 
banks.
lxxxiii Kuwait's Investment Dar (TID.KW), the Islamic firm that co -owns British luxury carmaker 
Aston Martin, received approval from almost 80% of creditors for a five -year plan to restructure about 
one billion dinars ($3.5 billion) of debt.
lxxxiv 
 
There is some monitoring of companies in other countries in MENA, and some countries’ policies 
and practices support consensual resolution of disputes. In Jordan, the Companies Control Department 
(CCD) does monitor companies through a special insolvency unit, and may  meet with creditors and 
request an informal standstill, though this is informal, and a part of the CCD‟s  financial supervisory 
power, rather than a legal framework designed to encourage negotiation.
lxxxv Saudi Arabia has recently 
developed legal provisions to encourage consensual arrangements to resolve liquidity problems, but as of 
mid-2009, the provisions were not yet in use.




Dubai World, Dubai’s high profile state-owned conglomerate that faced insolvency in 2009, agreed 
to  a  restructuring  deal with its leading creditors  in May  2010.  On May  20,  2010,  Dubai  World 
announced that it had reached a tentative deal with a broad array of 90 lenders, including HSBC, Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, to reschedule about 23.5 billion U.S. dollars of 
debt. The agreement effectively extends the length of the conglomerate‟s loans, giving it time to cut costs 
and sell assets and put itself in a better position to pay. A restructuring expert from the UK was brought in 
to head the effort. The bank coordinating committee involved in the negotiations represents about 60% of 
Dubai World‟s debt.
lxxxviii The deal proposal involved converting 8.9 billion USD of Dubai government 
debt owed by Dubai World to equity, with the Dubai government subordinating its position to other 
creditors. Moreover, the government (the owner of Dubai World) committed to fund up to $500m of 
SG&A (selling, general and administrative) expenses and an interest facility of up to $1.0 billion while 
maintaining 100% ownership. Creditors of about 14.4 billion USD of debt were being offered repayment 
of their debts in two tranches, the first tranche covering 4.4 billion USD, and the second, 10 billion USD, 
with five and eight year maturity, respectively. Creditors were offered a choice among three plans that 
addressed the method of payment of their funds in the second tranche. Options available to lenders were 
based on the currency in which they hold the debt, and their other preferences, such as whether they 
valued shortfall guarantees or higher payments in kind and cash. At the time of the announcement, the 





Are the proper incentives in place to encourage restructuring and workouts?  
 
The success or failure of any regime that purports to promote out of court reorganizations of 
distressed companies will depend on the incentives, or disincentives, as the case may be, that are 
built into the system.  MENA Countries vary at enabling corporate workouts through specific policies 
regarding debt treatment.  In the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), an investment/industrial 
free zone within the UAE, the economic environment encourages consensual arrangements to resolve 
financial issues. There are no adverse tax consequences to debt forgiveness, and debt-for-equity swaps are 
allowed, though subject to Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) oversight.
xc Qatar, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia also allow debt-for-equity swaps. Some MENA countries impose significant tax consequences for 
debt forgiveness, inhibiting a major out-of-court workout mechanism, including Egypt. However, others, 
such as Lebanon, DIFC, and Qatar do not impose tax penalties on debt forgiveness. Saudi Arabia allows 
deductibility of bad debts from Zakat.
xci Table 4 shows that no country in the region is known to have 
articulated out of court workout guidelines, but that most permit debt-for-equity swaps.  
 
An informal process is far more likely to be sustained where there are adequate creditor remedies 
and  insolvency  laws.
xcii  There  is  more  incentive  for  negotiation  among  parties  when  each  one  has 
recourse  to  effective  remedies  to  enforce  his  position—the  debtor  to  an  insolvency  proceeding  that 
protects his rights, and the creditor to his remedies in case of default. Moreover, parties are more likely to 
abide by an agreement if it is enforceable. 
 
In the MENA region, creditor rights and insolvency laws are not compliant with international 
standards, nor are they considered particularly effective by the users.
xciii However, many countries 
such as Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine and Saudi Arabia report an enabling environment for informal 
workouts, and particularly bilateral arrangements between creditor and debtor. The enabling environment 
referred to is based on culture and bank practice.
xciv Some of the motivation for negotiation between 
debtors and creditors is the very ineffectiveness of the system that could support workouts if it functioned.  
Indeed, it is often said that informal workouts can succeed in only two environments: Those in which the 
formal system is so perfectly calibrated as to allow debtors and creditors to accurately estimate their best 
alternatives to a negotiated settlement and those where the formal system is so inadequate as to 
incentivize debtors and creditors to resolve disputes on their own.  Debtors do not want the severe 
consequences from bankruptcy, which often include restriction of th eir civil rights. Creditors know that 
they likely will not recover through a bankruptcy, so they are motivated to settle with the debtor in order 
to recover something at all.
xcv In countries where bankruptcy is a collection tool, this „carrot-and-stick‟ 
describes the role of both the debtor and creditor—the threat of bankruptcy and ability to dismiss it vs. the 
desire to avoid bankruptcy incentivizes negotiation. 
 
Post-Commencement Finance: Is there encouragement of lending to distressed enterprises?  
 
Companies trying to reorganize typically require the provision of ongoing financing during the 
reorganization, but the concept of lending to distressed enterprises is not widespread in the region. 
In particular, the notion of „post commencement financing‟ is almost nonexistent. Nor does it appear there 
is  a  strong  practice  of  lending  to  companies  in  financial  distress,  as  recovery  chances  are  low.  In 23 
 
developed insolvency systems, post-petition financing is often provided to a company that is already in a 
formal  insolvency  proceeding.  Lenders  are  incentivized  by  being  granted  a  priority  position  in 
repayment—this can occur in a formal insolvency proceeding, or during an out-of-court restructuring 
proceeding that is conducted under guidelines such as in the London Approach.
xcvi  The system works 
because lenders find that being first in priority provides a relatively high chance of repayment, and so a 
practice has developed based on the legal regime. To promote such financing to insolvent companies in 
MENA, in arms-length transactions (as opposed to extensions of funds based on relationships), would 
require shifts in the attitude toward debtors, the legal system, and banking practice. 
 
Kuwait stands out from the crowd in responding to the 2008-2009 crisis by supporting lending to 
distressed enterprises. In response to the recent financial crisis, Kuwait enacted a financial stability 
stimulus  package  that  incentivized  lending  by  banks  to  enterprises  that  includes  wide-ranging  state 
guarantees for bank loans and assistance to troubled investment firms to repay their debts.  Legislation 
passed in the first half of 2009 stipulates that the state would guarantee 50 percent of an estimated four 
billion dinars (13.8 billion dollars) of new credit facilities to be granted by banks to local companies.
xcvii 
Other  Gulf  countries  have  taken  measures  in  response  to  the  crisis,  such  as  UAE‟s  bond  guarantee 
stimulate lending to distressed businesses. 
 
The need for liquidity post-petition is recognized in MENA countries, but response varies in type 
and extensiveness. In Jordan, while there is no post-petition financing in the absence of a reorganization 
law,  pursuant  to  the  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Law,  when  a  bank  is  in  liquidation  priority  is 
accorded to loans obtained “after the liquidity decision”, so that the concept is in the law, albeit currently 
limited to banks in distress.
xcviii In Qatar and Saudi Arabia, shareholders are expected to contribute capital 
to a distressed company. 
3.2. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
 Is alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation or conciliation available to resolve disputes between 
debtors and creditors to prevent insolvency filing? 
 
As previously stated, many of the countries in the region base their bankruptcy laws on the French 
model,  thus  its  preventative  provisions  which  utilize  alternative  dispute  resolution  to  prevent 
insolvency,  may  be  instructive.  In  France,  under a  relatively  new  procedure,  the  commercial  court 
president may appoint a mediator to assist the debtor in resolving specific issues with creditors. This 
procedure is referred to in French as mandataire ad hoc, or ad hoc mediation. The procedure is informal 
and  flexible.
xcix  The  court,  at  the  debtor‟s  request,  appoints  a  mediator,  normally  an  experienced 
insolvency trustee, to assist the debtor in negotiating with his creditor(s) to overcome his temporary 
financial distress. The French mediator‟s role is purely advisory, he has no authority over the debtor. He 
brings his skills in mediation and business understanding to assist, but not control debtor. The debtor 
enjoys no special protection such as a stay or any other elevation of his rights above those of creditors. 
Nor does it harm him reputationally, or inhibit his ability to obtain credit, as it is not published.
c If the 
debtor has ceased payments, he may use the slightly more complex conciliation procedure, a voluntary 
conciliation procedure between the debtor and creditor s. It is a four -month process, supervised by the 
commercial court power to negotiate agreements with creditors than the ad hoc mediator, including the 24 
 
authority to propose restructuring plans. The agreement between the debtor and creditor must be approved 
by the court. After approval, the agreement is binding on all parties to the agreement.  The French law 
allows for financing obtained after filing of the case to be repaid on a priority basis.
ci 
 
It is worth considering whether or not French bankruptcy preventative provisions are a worthy 
model  upon  which  to  build  a  local  foundation  in  Algeria,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Lebanon, 
Mauritania,  Morocco,  Oman,  Syria,  and  Tunisia--all  Francophone  countries  significantly 
influenced by the French legal system. Granting the court the ability to appoint, or even refer properly 
trained mediators , may be worthwhile, especially in cases where the bankruptcy is filed by one creditor 
seeking to collect a specific debt, and is essentially a two-party dispute.  In order for the system to be 
effective, it would have to be flexible, as in the French system. Moreover, it would require experienced 
mediators, skilled at negotiating, who also have the business skills to successfully assist the debtor in 
negotiations with creditors.  Given the lack of capacity, and propensity for delay and bureaucracy in the 
courts in the region, the courts would have to adopt a hands-off policy. Their job would be to provide a 
mediator, perhaps from a roster of approved mediators, to a company that requests such assistance. If 
mediators could be trained to be skilled in debtor/creditor negotiations, and the system could be created 
without imposing the current bureaucracy onto it, debt-resolution mediators may be a viable option to 
rehabilitate companies in the early stages of financial distress, before legal proceedings have begun. 
 
There are other procedures for preventing insolvency based on French law that have influenced 
MENA  Francophone  countries.    In  Morocco,  the  President  of  the  court  may  give  a  third  party  a 
mandate to reconcile partners and counterpart positions, similar to the French provision allowing for 
appointment of a mediator. During a conciliation procedure the court can also order a stay on creditor 
action when requested by the conciliator. Although court-controlled, the purpose of the procedure is to 
prevent an insolvency filing. The procedure in Morocco is markedly similar to the conciliation provisions 
in the French law. In addition, the Moroccan law contains amicable settlement procedure provisions 
aimed  at  preventing  insolvency,  which  last  four  months, and  are conducted by  a  conciliator,  not  an 
administrator, appointed by the court. If agreement is reached with creditors, it is confirmed by the court. 
The extent of use of conciliators during these procedures in Morocco is not clear. 
 
Banking practices seem to have provided somewhat of a supervisory/workout process in Jordan. In 
Jordan the role of financial supervisors in informal workouts has assumed greater prominence in the case 
of the largest Jordanian companies. The Companies Control Department (CCD) may be “triggered” to 
report  on  a  company  in  trouble,  and  may  meet  with  company  managers  and  creditors  to  request  a 
standstill and take other measures to promote restructuring. In meetings with Bank staff in 2009, the CCD 
reported that it was monitoring 30 companies.
cii  
 
Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution method used in the region. Arbitration conducted by 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  is  the  main  method  of  informal  or  out-of-court  restructuring  in  Saudi 
Arabia.
ciii Arbitration under the London International Court of Arbitration (LICA) model is available in 
the DIFC to promote workouts.
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Shari’a influence on informal workouts 
The prohibition on interest is one of the most well-known facets of Shari’a law as it 
relates to finance. Interest issues are reported to inhibit workouts in UAE, Yemen, 
Saudi, Oman, and in Qatar in relation to enforcement of claims, according to the 
MENA Report. When a disputed amount involves what can be perceived to be 
interest, if Shari’a is influential, the dispute can change from a straightforward 
contractual dispute to one that is subject to interpretation.  The influence of 
Shari’a varies.  In Saudi Arabia, shari’a compliant financing is widespread. Courts 
enforce shari’a, which leads to effective rewriting of commercial contracts. This 
undermines commercial certainty. The prohibition on interest can hamper typical 
remedies during financial distress, such as when a loan term is extended in 
exchange for higher interest—interest is not available as compensation in shari’a. 
Conversely, in Egypt, shari’a compliant financing is not significant in the markets, 


















4.  Institutions Implementing the Insolvency System  
4.1. Courts: Specialized courts, judges trained in bankruptcy 
 
Judges  trained  specifically  in  bankruptcy  and  its  procedures  should  hear  and  oversee 
bankruptcy cases, pursuant to best practice standard for implementation.cv  Insolvency is a 
complex procedure, distinct in its characteristics from general civil cases. Doing Business 2009 
concluded that recovery rates in insolvency cases were much higher in countries that have 
specialized bankruptcy courts.cvi Doing Business reports include a broad mix of economies, both 
developed and developing, and also with broad ranges of bankruptcy experience. It is important to 
note,  however,  that  the  successful  deployment  of  commercial  courts  requires  significant 
commitment beyond their mere creation. Creation of commercial courts with insufficient training of 
personnel, and where the new commercial courts absorb the deficiencies of the general courts, has 
been shown to be ineffective at improving insolvency processes.cvii 
 
In most of the MENA countries, there is a significant institutional capacity gap due to the lack of 
insolvency knowledge on the part of the judges. Several factors prevent specialization. When a general 
court hears cases, judges do not receive the critical mass of insolvency cases needed to build expertise. In 
some countries, judges are rotated between different courts, with different subject matter, so that any 
specialized training, or expertise gained from experience, ceases to be applied to insolvency cases once 




Commercial  courts  are  one  form  of  reform  undertaken  in  some  MENA  countries  to  promote 
specialization, with varying success in improving institutional knowledge and performance. Among 
the  countries  surveyed,  Morocco,  Tunisia  and  Egypt  have  recently  created  commercial  courts,  and 
provided  specialized  training.
cix  While there are still complaints about judge expertise, the situation 
improves as training continues. In Saudi Arabia, th ere is not a commercial court per se, but a two -tier 
court system, the shari‟a courts, and the Diwan al Mazalim, which has a commercial circuit. The training 
of the judges appears to be in shari‟a principles, rather than statutory law or commercial principles. Due 
to the requirements that transactions follow shari‟a principles, the courts in Saudi Arabia may examine the 
entire transaction for compliance with shari‟a and rewrite it, which makes parties apprehensive to use 
these courts. In DIFC, Oman and Lebanon, there are specialized insolvency judges that hear bankruptcy 
cases. In Kuwait, judges are also specialized and cases are heard by a bankruptcy circuit.
cx Given the 
number of countries such as Oman reporting low usage of the bankruptcy system, the number of countries 
reporting that there are designated insolvency experts, or commercial courts, to hear cases may sound 
curious. But as stated above, the designation of special courts, while a step in the right direction, does not 
in itself ensure an efficient bankruptcy system. 
 
4.2. Insolvency Administrators (Trustees): adequate selection and supervision procedures to 
ensure competence and integrity; sufficient powers to effectively administer estate. 
 
Insolvency administrators play a central role in a bankruptcy case. They are also called trustees, 
administrators, receivers, liquidators, insolvency representatives. Insolvency Administrators are usually 
given control over assets and significant authority to decide how and when assets are distributed. It is 
essential  that  insolvency  administrators  be  skilled,  efficient,  and  credible/trustworthy.
cxi  The Doing 
Business 2009 report also highlighted the fact that countries that had instituted certain minimum 
qualifications for trustees had higher recovery rates  in an insolvency proceeding.
cxii This element of the 
insolvency system is underdeveloped in many less developed insolvency systems, crippling them at a 
critical point in the implementation infrastructure.   
 
The reputation of insolvency administrators in MENA is weak. They are by and large not viewed as 
competent, skilled or efficient. In addition to a lack of qualification standards and training, they have 
incentives  to  prolong  procedures. These  incentives  include  the  vast  range  of  responsibilities  and the 
potential for liability for intended or unintended negligence, and their ability in many cases to charge 
more fees by prolonging the insolvency proceedings. 
cxiiiMoreover, the methods by which insolvency 
administrators calculate their feeds is not closely regulated and can sometimes lead to incentives, for the 
administrators, to needlessly prolong proceedings. As such, a clear framework for the basis on which fees 
will be calculated should be included as part of a regulatory framework. 
 
In  the  MENA  region,  there  are  no  countries,  other  than  DIFC,  that  report  that  insolvency 
administrators receive training in the economics, or legalities of the insolvency process. Nor are 
there significant qualifications necessary to become an insolvency administrator. In Morocco and Egypt, 
the insolvency administrators have law degrees or are accountants, and are appointed by the court but 27 
 
there is no insolvency-specific qualification. In Morocco they are court employees, civil servants, and in 
Egypt, they are members of the private sector, generally members of the legal community.
cxiv In Yemen, 
UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman and Saudi Arabia, there is no regulation of the insolvency 
practitioners at all.
cxv Neither do any of the countries report a need for insolvency practitioners to  carry 
insurance for negligence liability, despite their responsibility for safeguarding financial assets and 
managing complex matters.  
 
DIFC may be an exception. In DIFC, the region‟s insolvency law laboratory, insolvency administrators 
are regulated by the state, and there are required qualifications. Registration as an insolvency practitioner 
requires the insolvency practitioner to accept any appointment made by the Dubai court. The Registrar 
who is charged with insolvency administrator supervision has authority to make supervisory orders.
cxvi 
The DIFC scheme to regulate insolvency administrators appears to be the most developed in the region. 
 
Reform of insolvency administrators in MENA is only beginning. 
5.  Roadmap to Reform 
 
Countries in the MENA region have begun to undertake insolvency system reform. Though there are 
not yet modern laws in most countries, there are draft laws being developed or being considered in some 
that  would  mark  a  closer  move  toward international  best  practice. There  has  been tangible, realized 
progress  in  the  development  of  commercial  courts.    There  appears  to  be  substantial  interest  in 
reorganization/rehabilitation of companies.  
 
5.1. State of liquidation and reorganization, respectively 
 
Liquidation and reorganization are not yet  considered effective in MENA. Delays are the major 
challenge, as court systems are notably inefficient, slow, and overly formalistic and bureaucratic rather 
than focused on the economic issues of insolvent companies. Delay in a case where economic assets are at 
stake, diminishes the value of the assets and value of the proceeding. Cumbersome procedures, along with 
court inefficiency and institutional inertia, often lead to very low recovery for creditors in liquidation 
cases. In reorganization, though some countries, particularly those that base their law on the French 
model, have had quasi-reorganization provisions in their laws for years, reorganizations are rare, almost 
nonexistent in practice. The reasons are inadequacy of the legal provisions, a lack of expertise, a lack of 
practice in using them, and lack of supporting mechanisms such as financing or support of experts in 
corporate rehabilitation. Faced with such ineffective systems , debtors are not motivated to seek out the 




a.  Decriminalize insolvency; allow a fresh start after insolvency. The criminalization of insolvency 
can be a serious inhibitor of risk-taking in the economy. It also inhibits debtors from filing bankruptcy 
even when a bankruptcy is in the best interests of the creditors, for fear of prison. The most harmful 
aspect of criminalization of bankruptcy may be cultural. It fosters a culture where the debtor is viewed 
with suspicion, and is scrutinized for possible wrongdoing rather than assisted in rehabilitation. The 
economic aspects of a case can become lost if the focus is to find fault with debtor‟s actions. After the 
bankruptcy  case  is  properly  completed,  through  reorganization  or  liquidation,  individual  debtors 
should be discharged, i.e., freed from debt to allow a fresh start as an economic actor. 
 
b.  Modernize the laws. Many of the region‟s insolvency laws have not been revised in over a decade, or 
even  several  decades. The  inability  of  antiquated  bankruptcy  laws  to serve  the  needs  of  modern, 
sophisticated  economies  has  been  noted.  More  efficient  procedures  for  both  liquidation  and 
reorganization  are  needed.  Overall,  more  effective  reorganization  procedures  are  needed,  and 
liquidation procedures should be made more efficient and less formalistic, cumbersome and prone to 
delay. Specifics have been noted in the chapter after the discussions of liquidation, and reorganization. 
 
c.  Improve court function and efficiency. One of the major obstacles to efficiency of liquidation, and 
effectiveness of reorganization, in most of the countries, is court systems that are slow and ineffective. 
If the judicial system remains ineffective in implementing laws, then modernizing the text of the law 
will be ineffective. International best practice standards suggest specialized courts to hear insolvency 
cases. However, the benefits of specialization will not be realized by merely creating a bankruptcy 
court or a commercial court, if the courts will absorb the dysfunction of the general court system. Real 
reform for the judicial system, to promote efficiency, and a substantive and economic, rather than 
formalistic approach to cases, will be necessary to promote efficiency. 
 
d.  Enhance  the  capacity  of  professionals  involved  in  the  system.  In  insolvency,  the  insolvency 
practitioner/administrator  is  the  gatekeeper  for  all  significant  actions  taken  in  the  case,  from 
identification of assets, and claims, to collection and disposition of assets, to proper distribution of the 
proceeds. Most countries in the region do not have sufficiently competent administrators to efficiently 
carry out these duties. Countries should overhaul their regimes for insolvency practitioners to ensure 
adequate training, qualification, and supervision to insure integrity and proper performance of the 
insolvency administrator function. In addition to insolvency practitioners, other professionals involved 
in  the  system  would  benefit  from  capacity  building  as  well.  For  an  effective  insolvency  system, 
judges,  attorneys  and  accountants,  and  any  other  relevant  professionals,  must  understand  the 
economics of distressed companies and distressed assets. Similar capacity-building is necessary to 




Recent experience suggests that some countries in the region are ready to implement an out-of-29 
 
court restructuring scheme analogous to the London Approach. Due to the recent financial crisis, 
both Dubai and Kuwait have taken steps to enable out-of-court restructuring to prevent the bankruptcy 
filings of large companies important to their economies. The efforts have led to some initially successful 
restructurings. For countries where there are significant numbers of corporate entities with multiple 
institutional creditors, developing such schemes, with rules tailored to a country‟s needs, may be prudent. 
Financial crises can provide a laboratory to test and refine the rules, while allowing distressed companies 
to survive the financial storm. 
 
In countries where debtors do not have multiple creditors, developing reliable alternative dispute 
resolution services may be an effective tool to promote resolution of creditor-debtor disputes and 
avoid bankruptcy. The French model, which makes a mediator available to assist debtors in negotiations 
with creditors, may serve as a partial roadmap to MENA countries, particularly those with a Francophone 
tradition. Alternative dispute resolution may be particularly effective in two-party disputes, those between 
a debtor and a single creditor. Arbitration is already used in some MENA countries. Since many MENA 
countries report that debtors and creditors prefer informal resolution and negotiations to court, the market 
for alternative dispute resolution appears to exist. Developing effective, reliable access to mediation and 
perhaps arbitration may help some debtors and creditors resolve their disputes before resorting to an 
insolvency filing.  
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